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Introduction
This chapter examines the impact of regulations and law enforcement on the economic activities of informal traders and micro-entrepreneurs in marginalised communities on the urban periphery. Our case site is 
Browns Farm, Philippi, a township in the City of Cape Town, South Africa, 
where a micro-enterprise census and business operator survey was conducted 
in 2011 (Charman et al, 2015). The chapter argues that despite the signi cant
number of informal businesses in South African townships, the state continues 
to pursue efforts that either prevent formalisation or circumscribe informal 
activities. At the heart of our argument is the assertion that the informal 
economic practices of the urban poor constitute a ‘lived economy’ whose 
* We acknowledge the Sustainable Livelihoods Foundation (www.livelihoods.org) for 
providing access to the data and spatial maps.
1 Unemployment in South Africa is measured on a strict or ‘of cial’ de nition as those
people who desire employment and who take active steps to nd employment, and
is contrasted with an expanded de nition which is simple those people who desire
employment, whether or not they have taken active steps to nd it.
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dynamics are largely ‘unseen’ by the South African state and thus ‘disallowed’ 
in most policies. Consequently, informality is more the result of exclusion 
from state policy rather than exit by informal actors.
The study demonstrates this claim in quantitative and qualitative terms. 
Quantitatively the study looks to count all the businesses in a geographical 
sub-section of Philippi, interview the operators of the main business types, 
and assess how many fall foul of some state law. In the event we found 
some 1464 businesses, of which we estimate 1082 or 74 percent exist and 
operate in violation of some law. Qualitatively the study re ects on the nature
of the violation observing that the vast majority are the result of zoning 
restrictions or licensing violations rather than criminal activities or the sale 
of illegal products. In the majority of cases there is nothing businesses can 
do to comply with laws like zoning, and thus informality is a product of state 
exclusion rather than entrepreneurial exit. In addition, we draw attention to 
the colonial/apartheid origins of zoning, and the views on licenses informed 
by norms ‘from the suburbs’. 
This view resonates with theories of informality as state produced like 
James C. Scott (1999), Partha Chatterjee (2004) and Anaya Roy (2005). Where 
Scott sees states as attempting to make society ‘legible’ to control it, and 
shaping society in its categories, often ignoring and repressing the diversity 
of local practice, Chatterjee sees a more ambivalent relationship between the 
state and the poor. Thus while the poor have some power in being able to vote, 
Chatterjee points out that the poor are also the objects of bureaucratic-driven 
development, and as such are framed more as populations to managed for 
their well-being rather than as individual democratic citizens bearing rights. 
Lastly, writing more speci cally of the city, Roy argues that only certain kinds
of rule-breaking are designated informal, whereas those of wealthy elites who 
construct unauthorised settlements are invariably formalised by the city. On 
all these accounts, the formal versus informal is a product of state choice, 
often informed by élite bias. More speci cally, we follow Perry (2007) in
characterising the informality of town ship businesses in South Africa as 
mostly about policy ‘exclusion’ (in other words involuntary) rather than ‘exit’ 
(a voluntary choice).
Literature Review
Informal Enterprises and Formalisation
The growth of informal economies presents a potentially worrying scenario 
for developing country governments. There are valid concerns that informality 
sustains a segmented labour market, reduces state revenue through excluding 
pro table businesses from the tax net, and weakens the control of the state
over negative business impacts. There is also concern that informality affects 
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the ability of government to shape macro-economic development through 
its programmes and incentives (Gelb, Mengistae, Ramachandran and Shan, 
2009). Whilst enterprise formalisation should be regarded as an important 
goal, scholars have argued that it should not be translated into a ‘one size 
ts all’ approach, but can be advanced through a ‘variegated’ approach,
recognising that different enterprise sizes have different capacities to comply 
with regulation and scal obligations (see Williams and Nadin, 2014). In
developing countries, such approaches need to respond to the lived realities 
of persons engaged in informal micro-enterprises, whether employees or 
entrepreneurs. We argue this is not yet the approach in South Africa.
Informal micro-enterprises and activities are important for poor 
communities in South Africa, even though the level of participation is lower 
than anticipated for a country of comparable development challenges (Yu, 
2012). The informal economy provides a means of survival and livelihood 
for those excluded and marginalised from formal employment and business 
opportunities (Neves and Du Toit, 2012). Importantly, informality provides 
incubation for the emergence of micro-enterprises through affording 
comparative as well as competitive advantages over formal (larger) businesses. 
The role that these businesses ful l in providing employment and economic
opportunities has been acknowledged in academic research (Valodia, Davies 
Altman and Thurlow, 2007; Wills, 2009; Charman and Petersen 2014), though 
the impact on poverty remains poorly understood. For example, there is little 
data to quantify the contribution of informal businesses to poverty reduction. 
Despite policy uncertainty over the role of the informal sector, state 
policies (at national, provincial and local level) continue to circumscribe 
informal economic activities. These include measures that rely on incentives 
and those that rely on law enforcement. The latter includes police raids on 
unlawful street trading, the strategic targeting of unregulated businesses (the 
most notable example concerns township liquor traders), and the arrest and 
deportation of economic migrants working informally. There has been limited 
research on the impact of state action to control and or prohibit informal micro-
enterprises. In the WesternCape,whereour research is focused, the signi cance
of these actions on livelihoods receives media attention only when the affected 
parties respond through protest action (Tswanya, 2012), violence (Mtyala, 
2011) or advocacy (Damba, 2012). The topic is generally presented from a 
human rights perspective, focusing on the legality or otherwise of the state 
action, rather than the economic rationale of conducting business informally. 
The emphasis tends to fall on the illegality of informal trade, overlooking the 
reasons for informality, including those which Perry (2007) describes as the 
‘exit’ and ‘exclusion’. Exit factors discourage businesses (including micro-
enterprises) from operating formally when they have little reason to comply 
(though could potentially meet regulatory requirements), resulting in their 
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‘exit’ from formality, whereas exclusion factors are regulatory barriers and 
other constraints, including land systems that prevent micro-enterprises from 
operating legally even if they so desired. The former is a cost-bene t analysis;
the latter implies no choice.
As one example of exclusion, street traders are subject to a host of 
municipal regulations, in addition to provincial and national laws, that 
dictate the spaces and places at which they are permitted to conduct business. 
Municipal by-laws restricts their activities to operating in certain spaces, 
such as not within ve meters from an intersection, not next to a government
building, not in front of a park and not on the payment so as to obstruct 
pedestrian walkways (Sithole, 2012; Charman and Govender, 2016; Skinner, 
2008). In addition, street traders may not sell counterfeit goods, liquor, drugs 
or medicines and prepared food (take-aways) and perishable food without a 
licence and compliance with municipal health regulations and environmental 
regulations. The great majority of street hawkers would have to cease trading 
if they were to adhere voluntarily to these laws.
Urban Planning and Land Use Management as Tools of Exclusion
In Huchzermeyer’s Cities with Slums, she outlines the state’s systematic 
blindness towards the lived economy of the urban poor. She notes how post-
apartheid cities have embraced the model of ‘competitive cities’ that look 
to establish themselves as global brands attractive to ‘hyper-mobile capital’, 
both economic and human (2011: 47-52). These notions, central to the ideal 
of ‘world class cities’ are evident in the various 2020/2030 vision documents 
embraced by Durban, Cape Town and Johannesburg, and how they have 
been implemented around public-private partnerships. The urban poor, 
Huchzermeyer argues, are marginal to this model as they are ‘a population 
that is super uous to growth in the formal economy or embarrassing to those
aspiring to world class city status’ (2011: 53). 
In support of the concerns expressed by Huchzermeyer, our analysis 
focus on how spatial development and land use management imposes a 
vision of urban life that runs directly against the lived economy of the urban 
poor. Land use management centres on notion of protecting people and the 
environment from ‘the externalities of development’ (Nel, 2016:258). The 
main mechanisms in land use management seek to control the density and/
or intensity of land use in the belief that the change in these variables would 
have a negative impact on people, the environment, or wealth generation. This 
thinking has invited the critique that if land management systems underpin 
wealth, then on the basis of the principle of equality, the poor should also 
bene t from these systems (Parnell and Pieterse, 2010). However, the current
nature of land management in South Africa either directly excludes the poor, 
or indirectly marginalises them through failing to take account of the nature 
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of their lives and settlement conditions. Notably, in South Africa the effects 
of colonial and apartheid racialised urban spatial control is still felt in most 
townships. Within these settlements there is almost no commercial land, 
whilst spatial plans are biased towards residential land use and do not provide 
land or rights to address the need for residents to operate businesses (Parnell 
and Pieterse 2010). 
In 2013 the Spatial Planning and Land use Management Act (SPLUMA) 
replaced apartheid era planning legislation, and includes commitments to 
seeking to bring about spatial justice. It does however, retain an emphasis on 
spatial control. Indeed, Nel (2016) has argued that although SPUMLA claims 
to redress past land management system injustices, it actually reinforces 
exclusionary modernist planning regimes, especially the code approach and 
the use of zoning schemes. In terms of the spatial management of township 
localities, municipal governments are further mandated to devise and 
implement planning schemes, property zones and by-laws. These instruments 
are intended to enable municipalities to control (and minimise) the perceived 
negative impacts within settlements, including the impact of businesses on the 
environment and encroachment of public space.
In line with this mandate the City of Cape Town has adopted a Spatial 
Development Framework (SDF), wherein it has established guidelines about 
‘how and where Cape Town should grow in the future’ (City of Cape Town, 
SDF 2012). The goals of the SDF are supported by the ‘Cape Town Zoning 
Scheme’ (CTZS) which appoints and formalises various land use designations 
on all landholdings. These include residential, agricultural, industrial 
and commercial activities. The CTZS acknowledges differences between 
‘township’ and ‘suburb’ residential areas, and ‘in recognition of the realities 
of poor and marginalised communities, development rules . . . are not very 
restrictive and local employment generation is encouraged’ (CTZS, 2012: 
40). As per this accommodation, household in formally planned township 
residential areas are permitted to operate certain home-based business 
activities including house shops, child care (up to six children), business 
services, religious businesses and informal trading. 
In reality however, the variegation in City policy is limited. Thus the 
business activities allowed in the CTZS are additional to existing residential 
use and subject to certain constraints including oor space, signage, and
limited opening hours. Buildings used for enterprise activities must have 
approved plans, a requirement that requires demonstration of land/property 
ownership and the use of approved building materials. Some businesses are 
explicitly prohibited including operating video and gaming machines and 
liquor retailing. Furthermore, the CTZS excludes business activities that may 
present a ‘potential sources of nuisance’, broadly de ned, and including noise
and waste pollution. The de nition potentially extends to mechanical repairs,
Informality Disallowed
424
panel beating, light manufacturing, glass and metal recycling, traditional beer 
brewing, live chicken sales, food preparation, appliance repairs and transport 
services. All such activities can be shut down at City’s discretion.
Furthermore, there are planning provisions and regulations for informal 
trading to control the physical nature of buildings which precludes the use 
of self-built structures and shipping containers as business venues. Lastly, 
the CTZS aims to concentrate township business activity within speci c and
formalised ‘local’ and ‘general’ business zones. Business zoning is pertinent 
to the township environment for it allows for a much wider variety of micro-
enterprise activities. In support of policy objectives, zoning has been applied 
to many high streets and public transport nodes with a view to encouraging 
business activity migration out of from residential areas. The consequent 
creation of business ‘high streets’ has been embraced by political leadership 
as ‘solution’ to their policies which seeks to eradicate certain businesses from 
the township (Meyer, 2012). 
Methodology
In 2011 the authors, as part of a research project of the Sustainable Livelihoods 
Foundation, undertook a micro-enterprise census in Browns Farm, a settlement 
of about 41,000 persons and 14,355 households within an area of 2km2. 
Browns Farm is located in Philippi, on the Cape Flats, approximately 20km 
distant from the city centre of Cape Town. Situated adjacent to the Philippi 
Industrial Area, the township comprises three different settlement typologies: 
informal settlements (slum), state-built housing and bonded private housing 
in planned residential areas. The study site encompasses three quarters of the 
Browns Farm area. The site is bordered by a railway line (South and West), 
an informal high street (East) and major arterial road (North). Along the 
northern boundary, the site contains a strip of commercial land. There are few 
opportunities for formal employment in Browns Farm; indeed, 41% of the 
labour force is unemployed on the expanded de nition1 (Statistics SA, Census
2011). Formal employment must be sought outside the area and workers 
access formal labour markets in the Central Business District, industrial areas 
and middle class suburbs via taxi, train and (relatively uncommon) private 
vehicles. There is both a train station and taxi rank situated within the site.
The research sought to identify and record the spatial position of all 
economic activities in the site, whether situated on private or private land. 
Data was obtained through a surveying process, covering the area street-by-
street and recording all identi able businesses. The research recorded the
main characteristics of each business, including the products sold, enterprise 
structure and spatial position. In the case of those businesses engaged in 
grocery retailing (spaza shops), liquor trading (informal shebeens and licensed 
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taverns), the provision of educare/child care services and traditional medicine, 
detailed interviews were conducted with each entrepreneur or the business 
operator. These interviews explored speci c aspects of business informality,
including the sale of contraband/illegal goods, the use of illegal structures 
and signage, the positioning of businesses in public spaces, the provision of 
informal employment, and the impact of law enforcement on the business 
(Charman et al, 2015).
Research Results
Micro-Enterprise Activities
The research identi ed 1601 micro-enterprises. The businesses were then
classi ed according to the services and goods sold and grouped under thirty
categories. The spatial distribution of the categorised businesses within the 
site are presented on a map (Figure 1). In order to investigate the in uence
of land use planning on business position, the distribution of these micro-
enterprises was overlain on land use zones as determined in the City of Cape 
Town spatial development framework (Figure 2). Then in order to consider 
the speci c relationship between enterprise sectors and land use zones, we
examined a portion of the site in depth. The selected portion included the area 
surrounding the Philippi train station and taxi rank, which constitutes the main 
point of entry and exit into the site (Figure 3).
The Scale of Informality 
In order to quantify the tension between the lived economy of Browns Farm 
and city policy, we examined the status of each micro-enterprise in terms 
of three criteria: rst, the legality of the business with respect to regulatory
requirements; second, the spatial position of the business and its legality in 
terms of land use restrictions; and third, whether there was trade in illegal 
products. Our analysis excludes a consideration of the citizenship status of 
the entrepreneurs or informal employees (i.e. were they illegal immigrants) 
as well as the legality of informal workers in terms the statutory requirements 
of labour legislation. We have also excluded the business contravention of 
signage by-laws. These two sets criteria would de nitely in uence the results
further, pushing the nal gure up a signi cant degree. Nevertheless, in terms
of the three initial considerations, our analysis found that 74 percent (or 1082) 
of the total number of micro-enterprises (1464) in Browns Farm operate 
illegally. The results for each enterprise category are shown in Table 1. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of Micro-Enterprises by Enterprise Category, 
Browns Farm and Hazeldean Estate, Philippi, November 2011
Figure 2: Distribution of Identi ed Micro-Enterprises in Context of Land
Use Categories, Browns Farm and Hazeldean Estate, Philippi, November 
2011
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Figure 3: Distribution of Identi ed Micro-Enterprises in Context of Land
Use Categories, Browns Farm and Hazeldean Estate, Philippi, November 
2011
About half of these businesses are subject to regulation or licensing. Apart 
from educares and shebeens, the enforcement of regulations would curtail 
accommodation businesses (motels), butchers, traditional healers and doctors, 
vendors selling prepared food, informal taxis and spaza shops (on the basis 
that all shops sell perishable food products such as milk). Excluding these 
micro-enterprises, land use restrictions would affect over 400 other micro-
enterprises including businesses rearing livestock; building services like 
welding; vehicle repair businesses like panel beaters; businesses operating 
out of shipping containers (game shops, greengrocers, hair care/barber shops, 
phone shops, hardware sale and tailoring businesses); businesses engaged in 
micro-manufacturing in public space; recycling businesses where materials 
are stored on public land; and street traders. Land use restrictions would 
signi cantly impact on 74 of the 135 spaza shops in Browns Farm (55%) as 
they operate either out of shipping containers or from purpose built shacks. 




Table 1: Scope and Scale of Informality Disallowed in Browns Farm
Micro-Enterprise Categories
 











Accommodation 2 2   
Agriculture 10  10  
Building Services 54  9  
Businesses Services 25    
Butcher Shops 17 17   
Car Washes 22    
Drug Dealers 8   8
Educares 42 26   
Electrical and Mechanical 
Repair 54  54  
Entertainment 3    
Food Retail 7    
Game Shops 4  4  
Green Grocers 72  1  
Hair Care 132  92  
Health Services 47 41  3
House Shops 228    
House Stands 14    
Micro-Manufacture 13  7  
Other 2    
Personal Services 14 4   
Phone Shops 34  24  
Places of Worship 61  61  
Recycling 67  67  
Shebeens 287 287   
Spaza Shops  135 74 34
Tailoring and Cobbling 36  1  
Take Aways 110 110   
Taverns 7    
Trade (General) 49   5
Transport 45 40   
  662 404 50
Total 1464 1082
Source: SLF Business Census Philippi.
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Notably, the majority of these disallowed micro-enterprises sustain value 
chains to formal businesses that manufacture the legal products that they 
retail informally. This is indisputable in the case of shebeens, spazas, house 
shops, hair salons, green grocers and the street vendors selling chips, sweets 
and cigarettes. Strong informal-formal linkages are also evident among street 
butchers who obtain spent hens from battery farms, the 5th quarter off-cuts 
from abattoirs, and specialist food retailers who sell dairy products, processed 
and frozen foods. The disallowed businesses also provide employment, with 
shebeens and spaza shops having an employment factor greater than two. 
Indeed, a study on the economic impact of shebeens in the Western Cape 
found that these micro-enterprises provide on average 2.7 permanent jobs 
and 0.8 part-time jobs (Petersen and Charman, 2010). At least half this 
number again, moreover, bene t indirectly from employment or economic
opportunities through downstream multipliers in businesses such as street 
braais, cash washes, and glass recyclers.
The Violation of Spatial and Aesthetic Policy Objectives 
The distribution of micro-enterprises de es the spatial and aesthetic objectives
of the City’s Spatial Development Framework and allied regulations on 
business activities. Apart from seven taverns, 16 educares and about a dozen 
other businesses, most businesses are unregistered and violate regulations in 
one or more aspect of their practice. Their spatial distribution in Figure 2 
illustrates this contestation. The majority of Browns Farm micro-enterprises 
are situated in the heart of residential areas, away from major roads, with the 
exception of the street traders clustered either side of the ‘high street’ leading 
towards the taxi rank/train station. Under the CTZS designations, the Browns 
Farm case study site contains areas designated ‘residential’, ‘limited use’, 
‘community local’ and ‘general industrial’. These categories do not re ect
either existing settlement typologies or micro-enterprise activities, but rather 
the ‘lived economy’ of the urban poor. 
Notably, the density of micro-enterprise distribution is greatest in 
areas of informal settlement, most of which are located on land designated 
as ‘limited use’. In areas designated as residential land, the distribution of 
micro-enterprises is highly even, con rming that homes are important sites
for economic activities. The most signi cant home-based activities are
liquor trading (shebeens), grocery retailing (spaza shops and house shops) 
and food takeaways. The spatial distribution of shebeens and spaza shops is 
remarkably evenly dispersed (Figures 2 and 3), revealing how the positioning 
of these businesses is determined by localised demand. These businesses are 
located in close proximity to people’s homes, combining accessibility with 
customer safety. The idea that these enterprises could (or should) be relocated 
to high streets or non-residential areas along high streets de es organic
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business development, economic logic, local consumer preferences and 
most importantly the livelihoods of the entrepreneurs themselves (Charman, 
Petersen and Piper, 2012). In short, throughout residential areas, work and 
home life are closely intertwined. 
In order to bene t from the comparative advantage of the home position
in terms of its proximate market or situate the business close to high volume 
pedestrian traf c, entrepreneurs have utilised a range of mobile, semi-mobile
and stationary structures. These include shacks built from corrugated iron, 
metal shipping containers, stalls and stands. Most of these business structures 
do not adhere to regulations on building standards and informal trade, with 
shipping containers a particular target of City law enforcement, especially 
where these are situated on city land. One of the major policy concerns in 
respect of these businesses is their supposed aesthetic impact on the character 
of the neighbourhood. Traders must obtain a speci c permit to use a container
(City of Cape Town, 2013). Yet these business structures are highly sought after, 
especially among entrepreneurs running hair salons, spaza shops, hardware 
stores, phone shops and businesses involved in the repair of electrical and 
mechanical goods. Shipping containers provide greater security because they 
are dif cult to break into and enable the entrepreneur to link their business to
a tradable property that can be sold as one entity.
The widespread use of advertising on spaza shops renders absurd the 
efforts of local government to uphold residential aesthetics. Spazashops have 
become brand ambassadors. Shop frontages have been painted to enhance 
the brand identify of sponsors (typically with advertising for cell phone or 
cooldrink companies). Many shops also sport billboards declaring the name of 
the business and the logo of the company that sponsored the sign. Municipal 
regulations on signage are thus widely outed. Hair care businesses similarly
disregard the aesthetics of moderate signage. Both the business name and 
examples of popular styles are painted on the outside of the container or shack 
to achieve maximum exposure. 
Resisting ‘Enforced Informalisation’
We have argued elsewhere that the use of regulation to set standards impossible 
for informal traders of legal goods to meet constitutes the prevention of 
formalisation or ‘enforced informalisation’ (Charman, et al, 2012). The 
case of unregulated liquor provides the clearest example. In addition, we 
disagree with the argument of Kanbur (2009) that the enforcement of law 
on unregulated informal businesses will result in these businesses moving 
away from deliberate evasion towards either avoidance or compliance. We 
have argued that many informal businesses will continue to evade regulation 
through reorganising the business in a way that minimises risks of detection 
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and the consequences of prosecution. This has happened among shebeens in 
Browns Farm.
Our research was conducted at a time in which the South African police 
was systematically targeting liquor traders under the Western Cape Provincial 
Government’s policy objective to remove liquor trading in residential areas 
(Meyer 2012, Mtyala, 2011). The research found that shebeens were the most 
common type of enterprise in Browns Farm, with 286 shebeens compared to 
just seven licenced taverns. Similarly, the number of unregulated educares 
exceeded regulated businesses by 26 to 16. Furthermore, only one of the 
traditional healers we identi ed and interviewed was formally registered
though some were aligned with informal networks. All these micro-enterprises 
operate in spite of the law enforcement risks. The level of risk varies in 
accordance with policy priorities, with unregulated liquor traders subject 
to more systematic arrest and prosecution than either educare businesses or 
traditional healers. Over sixty per cent of the liquor traders we interviewed 
(n=239) had been raided by police in the preceding 12 months. The targeting 
of shebeens has resulting in their downscaling and the use of strategies to 
obfuscate prosecution through for example, storing liquor off site. 
Notably, law enforcement has neither resulted in signi cant numbers
of these businesses closing down (compliance) or moving to sectors where 
regulation is less onerous such as fast food retail (avoidance). The most 
common response to police harassment and prosecution is an acceptance of the 
cost association of con scated stock and nes, and treating law enforcement
as an informal system of taxation. Indeed, many business owners bribe the 
police to continue their business (Charman, Herrick and Petersen, 2014; 
Herrick and Charman, 2013). The ‘enforced informalisation’ of liquor traders 
impacts negatively on those micro-enterprises that bene t from economic
multipliers, such as the micro-enterprises that collect beer and spirit bottles 
for recycling or the street braa is that serve shebeen customers. As shebeens 
go underground, these businesses have to curtail their activities. The range 
of affected businesses is broad and includes car guards, car washes, spaza 
shops selling cigarettes, cool drinks and airtime, DJs and poster-makers, as 
well as larger businesses that provide juke-boxes, pool tables and table soccer 
machines.
The object of regulation in the liquor sector sector is to control supply 
rather than maintain product integrity. There are several sectors, in contrast, 
that sell products that are produced informally and thus avoid state controls 
and taxation. State regulation of these products is ineffective or haphazard at 
least. Our research found that 34 spaza shops in Browns Farm, for example, 
sold contraband tobacco products, though the actual number is probably far 
greater. All the spaza businesses we identi ed, nevertheless, sold cigarettes
as loose items in contravention of the Tobacco Control Act, to customers of 
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all ages including school children. Most of the street butchers sold meat not 
inspected and declared safe for human consumption, while on-site slaughtering 
of livestock is common. Traditional healers (and pharmacists of traditional 
medicine) stocked and produced medicines from illegally harvested and 
legally protected resources, including both fauna and ora indigenous to the
fynbos biome. We further identi ed a number of street vendors selling bootleg
CDs and DVDs, counterfeit shoes and clothing brands and in some cases, 
stolen goods.
Order Above Opportunity in Formal Market Places
The City of Cape Town has constructed a number of ‘market places’ for 
informal trading, situating these markets at important transport interchanges 
and entry points into the townships (City of Cape Town, 2013). One of these 
markets has been built at the Philippi train station. The market structure 
comprises a taxi rank and row of 20 enclosed, semi-detached, stalls. The 
present occupants use these stalls to sell fruit and vegetables, air time, electrical 
goods, traditional medicine, take away food and drink, and operate a shebeen 
and shoe repair business. On the high street leading away from the station, no 
sites have been demarcated for street traders. This implies that the City sought 
to constrain the geographic boundaries of the market to the station precinct. 
If order and control was its objective, the City’s efforts have not succeeded 
for the actual market place of this transport zone embodies a profusion of 
informality. The spatial distribution of informal businesses operating within 
the broader geographic area of the Philippi train station is shown in Figure 3. 
Whereas the taxi rank was intended to impose order through centralising 
the point of passenger collection/drop off, it serves a relatively small portion 
of commuter traf c. From outside the rank along the high street operates a eet
of informal taxis, collecting and dropping off passengers wherever the client 
desires. These taxis are not registered with the Provincial transport authorities. 
Known colloquially as ‘cockroaches’, they operate with the sanction of taxi 
associations because they provide the important link between the side streets 
and high street. The taxi drivers advertise their service by repeatedly sounding 
car horns. 
The existing informal arrangements of businesses create an extensive 
shopping opportunity for local residents and commuters. Along the street, 
numerous micro-enterprises operate from street stands, corrugated shacks, 
shipping containers and buildings. In order to position their business as close 
to the passing pedestrians, most of these businesses have encroached upon the 
pathway, thus contravening municipal by-laws. The range of these businesses 
is quantitatively more diverse than possible in the formal market place. They 
comprise fruit and vegetable stalls, stands selling sweets and cigarettes, a 
cluster of traditional healers, home improvement services, business services 
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(typing and internet access), furniture manufacture, car spares and repair, 
prefabricated houses, second hand clothes and shoes, plastic containers and 
versions of Tupperware and a plethora of food takeaways. There are over 100 
street traders positioned along the main road between the station entrance and 
the rst major intersection.
One of the most numerous (and signi cant) businesses along the high
street, however, are barber shops and hair salons. These businesses enable 
commuters to get their hair cut or beards shaved from a business of their 
preference on route to their destination. The experience of the Philippi high 
street shows that commuters regard travel as an opportunity to attend to other 
business matters including shopping, preferring the diversity and exibility
offered by informal micro-enterprises along the street to the restriction of 
choice that ordered, formalised, market places necessitate.
Conclusions
This chapter has attempted to show the signi cant scale of informal business
in South Africa’s townships, and how this informality survives despite the 
exclusionary policies of the state. Illustrated through a census of all businesses 
in a section of Browns Farm, Philippi, in the City of Cape Town, the chapter 
demonstrates how zoning practices, as well as by-laws on health and safety, 
congestion and aesthetics run counter to the ‘lived economy’ of poor, black 
residents of the city. Indeed, despite some small steps by the City of Cape 
Town in the direction of a more variegated approach to business development 
the vast majority of informal enterprises exist in tension with city zoning and 
licensing laws. Thus not only does the lived economy of the township thus 
remain largely ‘unseen’ by the state, but the City continues to adopt policies 
that prevent formalisation and circumscribe informality. 
A key objective of this chapter has been to make visible the ‘lived 
economy’ by offering some insight into the scale and nature of informal 
business. Thus in respect of scale we estimate that over 70 percent of informal 
businesses do not meet the standards of the law. In respect of nature, we draw 
attention to the difference between exit from formality and (involuntary) 
exclusion by formal actors. It is it clear that some businesses could operate 
formally choose to operate informally for cost-bene t reasons. This is
informality as exit. However, we argue that in most cases informal businesses 
retail legal products but are unable to formalise as the standards of formality 
are either entirely exclusionary (e.g. zoning) or unrealistically high for a poor 
and crowded settlement (e.g. space requirements for educares). Thus while 
both ‘exit’ and ‘exclusion’ co-exist, and sometimes the boundary between 
the two is blurred, our research con rms that planning approaches as well as
enterprise formalisation policies simply do not recognise the realities of the 
lived economy of informal micro-enterprises, business activity and localised 
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demand. If anything, these approaches re ect the suburban imaginary of Cape 
Town as a ‘world-class city’, and informality remains disallowed. 
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